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Subjective and Objective Probabilities in Quantum Mechanics
Mark Srednicki∗
Department of Physics, University of California, Santa Barbara, CA 93106 USA
We discuss how the apparently objective probabilities predicted by quantum mechanics can be
treated in the framework of Bayesian probability theory, in which all probabilities are subjective.
Our results are in accord with earlier work by Caves, Fuchs, and Schack, but our approach and
emphasis are different. We also discuss the problem of choosing a noninformative prior for a density
matrix.
I. INTRODUCTION
Probability plays a central role throughout human af-
fairs, and so everyone has an intuitive idea of what it
is. Moreover, because of the extreme generality and
widespread use of the concept of probability, it cannot
be easily defined in terms of anything more basic. For
example, the dictionary that I have in my office, Web-
ster’s Ninth New Collegiate, says that probability is “the
state or quality of being probable”; that to be probable
is to be “supported by evidence strong enough to estab-
lish presumption but not proof”; and that presumption
is “the ground, reason, or evidence lending probability to
a belief”. This is clearly unhelpful to anyone who does
not already know what probability is.
In mathematics and physics, we are often faced with a
concept that is both simple enough to be clearly under-
stood, and fundamental enough to resist definition; for
example, a straight line in euclidean geometry. To make
progress, we do not attempt to devise ever clearer defini-
tions, but instead formulate axioms that our understood
but undefined objects are postulated to obey. Then, us-
ing codified rules of logical inference, we prove theorems
that follow from the axioms.
It is instructive to treat probability as one of these
primitive concepts. Dispensing, then, with any attempt
at definition, we say that the probability that a state-
ment is true is a real number between zero and one. A
statement may be true or false; if we know it to be true,
we assign it a probability of one, and if we know it to
be false, we assign it a probability of zero. If we do not
know whether it is true or false, we assign it a probability
between zero and one.
There is typically no definitive way to make this as-
signment. Different people could (and often do) assign
different numerical values to the probability that some
particular statement (“the stock price of Microsoft will
be higher one year from now”) is true. In this sense,
probability is subjective. This point of view is Bayesian.
Probability also enters quantum mechanics, in a seem-
ingly more fundamental way. For example, given a
wave function ψ(x, t) for a particle in one dimension,
the rules of quantum mechanics (which are apparently
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laws of nature) tell us that we must assign a probability
|ψ(x, t)|2 dx to the statement “at time t, the particle is
between x and x + dx”. Different people do not appear
to have a choice about this assignment. In this sense,
quantum probability appears to be objective.
The goal of this paper is to understand the how the ap-
parently objective probababilities of quantum mechanics
can be fit into the Bayesian framework, which allows dif-
ferent people to make different probability assignments.
This issue has been addressed before by Caves, Fuchs,
and Schack [1], and our results are in broad agreement
with theirs. However, we emphasize a somewhat differ-
ent approach to certain issues that we will explain as we
go along.
In section II, in order to fix the notation and key con-
cepts, we briefly review the axioms and basic theorems
of probability theory. In section III, we introduce the
notion of a probability of a probability, and explain how
it can be applied to experimental data to turn an origi-
nally subjective probability into an increasingly objective
one, in the sense that all but strongly biased observers
agree with the final probability assignment. In section
IV, we apply this formalism to the probabilities of quan-
tum mechanics. In section V, we discuss when and why
it is preferable to assign probabilities to possible density
matrices for a quantum system, rather than assigning
a particular density matrix. In section VI, we discuss
the construction of noninformative prior distributions for
density matrices. We summarize and conclude in section
VII.
II. THE AXIOMS OF PROBABILITY
The statements to which we may assign probabilities
must obey a logical calculus. Some key definitions (in
which “iff” is short for “if and only if”):
S = a statement.
Ω = a statement known to be true.
∅ = a statement known to be false.
S = a statement that is true iff S is false.
S1 ∨ S2 = a statement that is true iff either S1 or S2
is true.
S1 ∧ S2 = a statement that is true iff both S1 and S2
are true.
S1 and S2 are mutually exclusive iff S1 ∧ S2 = ∅.
2S1, . . . , Sn are a complete set iff S1 ∨ . . .∨ Sn = Ω and
Si ∧ Sj = ∅ for i 6= j.
Elementary logical relationships among statements in-
clude S ∨ S = Ω, S ∧ S = ∅, S ∧Ω = S, S1 ∧ (S2 ∨ S3) =
(S1 ∧ S2) ∨ (S1 ∧ S3), etc. Denoting the probability as-
signed to a statement S as P (S), we can state the first
three axioms of probability.
Axiom 1. P (S) is a nonnegative real number.
Axiom 2. P (S) = 1 iff S is known to be true. Axiom
3. If S1 and S2 are mutually exclusive, then P (S1∨S2) =
P (S1) + P (S2).
From these axioms, and the logical calculus of state-
ments, we can derive some simple lemmas:
Lemma 1. P (S ) = 1− P (S).
Lemma 2. P (S) ≤ 1.
Lemma 3. P (S) = 0 iff S is known to be false.
Lemma 4. P (S1 ∧ S2) = P (S1) + P (S2)− P (S1 ∨ S2).
We omit the proofs, which are straightforward.
We will also need the notion of a conditional statement
S2|S1. S2|S1 is a statement if and only if S1 is true; oth-
erwise, S2|S1 is not a statement, and cannot be assigned
a probability. Given that S1 is true, the statement S2|S1
is true if and only if S2 is true. The probability that
S2|S1 is true is then specified by
Axiom 4. P (S2|S1) = P (S1 ∧ S2)/P (S1).
Note that, if P (S1) = 0, then S1 = ∅ by Lemma 3,
and so both sides of Axiom 4 are undefined: the right
side because we have divided by zero, and the left side
because S2|∅ is not a statement.
Another concept we will need is that of independence
between statements. Two statements are said to be in-
dependent if the knowledge that one of them if true tells
us nothing about whether or not the other one is true.
Thus, if S1 and S2 are independent, we should have
P (S1|S2) = P (S1) and P (S2|S1) = P (S2). Using these
relations and Axiom 4, we get a result that can be used
as the definition of independence,
S1 and S2 are independent if and only if P (S1 ∧S2) =
P (S1)P (S2).
Note that independence is a property of probability as-
signments, rather than the statements themselves. Thus,
people can disagree on whether or not two statements are
independent.
III. PROBABILITIES OF PROBABILITIES
What limitations, if any, should be placed on the na-
ture of statements to which we are allowed to assign prob-
abilities?
There are various schools of thought. Frequentists as-
sign probabilities only to random variables, a highly re-
stricted class of statements that we shall not attempt to
elucidate. Bayesians allow a wide range of statements,
including statements about the future such as “when this
coin is flipped it will come up heads,” statements about
the past such as “it rained here yesterday,” and time-
less statements such as “the value of Newton’s constant
is between 6.6 and 6.7 × 10−11m3/kg s2.” Some level of
precision is typically insisted on, so that, for example,
“red is good” might be rejected as too vague.
A major thesis of this paper is that the class of al-
lowed statements should include statements about the
probabilities of other statements. Some Bayesians (for
example, de Finetti [2]) reject this concept as meaning-
less. However, it has found some acceptance and utility
in decision theory, where it is sometimes called a sec-
ond order probability; see, e.g., [3]. In particular, it is
an experimental fact that people’s decisions depend not
only on the probabilities they assign to various alterna-
tives, but also on the degree of confidence that they have
in their own probability assignments [3]. This degree of
confidence can be quantified and treated as a probability
of a probability.
To illustrate how we will use the concept, consider the
following problem. Suppose that we have a situation with
exactly two possible outcomes (for example, a coin flip).
Call the two outcomes A and B. In the terminology of
the logical calculus, A∨B = Ω and A∧B = ∅, so that A
and B are a complete set. The probability axioms then
require P (A) + P (B) = 1, but do not tell us anything
about either P (A) or P (B) alone.
In the absence of any other information, we invoke
Laplace’s principle of insufficient reason (also called the
principle of indifference): when we have no cause to pre-
fer one statement over another, we assign them equal
probabilities. Thus we are instructed to choose P (A) =
P (B) = 1
2
. While this assignment is logically sound, we
clearly cannot have a great deal of confidence in it; typ-
ically, we are prepared to abandon it as soon as we get
some more information.
Another (and, we argue, better) strategy is to retreat
from the responsibility of assigning a particular value to
P (A), and instead assign a probability P (H) to the state-
ment H = “the value of P (A) is between h and h+ dh.”
Here dh is infinitesimal, and 0 ≤ h ≤ 1. Then P (H)
takes the form p(h)dh, where p(h) is a nonnegative func-
tion that we must choose, normalized by
∫ 1
0
p(h)dh = 1.
We might choose p(h) = 1, for example.
Now suppose we get some more information about A
and B. Suppose that the situation that produces either
A or B as an outcome can be recreated repeatedly (each
repetition will be called a trial), and that the outcomes of
the different trials are (we believe) independent. Suppose
that the result of the first N trials is NA A’s and NB B’s,
in a particular order. What can we say now?
The formula we need is
Bayes’ Theorem. P (H |D) = P (D|H)P (H)/P (D).
Bayes’ theorem follows immediately from Axiom 4; since
H ∧ D is the same as D ∧ H , we have P (H |D)P (D) =
P (H ∧D) = P (D|H)P (H). While H and D can be any
allowed statements, the letters are intended to denote
“hypothesis” and “data”. Bayes’ theorem tells us that,
given a hypothesisH to which we have somehow assigned
a prior probability P (H) (whether by the principle of in-
difference, or by any other means), and we know (or can
3compute) the likelihood P (D|H) of getting a particular
set of data D given that the hypothesis H is true, then
we can compute the posterior probability P (H |D) that
the hypothesis H is true, given the data D that we have
obtained. Furthermore, if we have a complete set of hy-
pothesesHi, then we can express P (D) in terms of the as-
sociated likelihoods and prior probabilities: starting with
D = D∧Ω = D∧(H1∨H2∨. . .) = (D∧H1)∨(D∧H2)∨. . . ,
and noting that D∧Hi andD∧Hj are mutually exclusive
when i 6= j, we have
P (D) =
∑
i
P (D ∧Hi) =
∑
i
P (D|Hi)P (Hi), (1)
where the first equality follows from Axiom 3, and the
second from Axiom 4.
To apply these results to the case at hand, recall that
our hypothesis is H = “P (A) is between h and h+ dh”.
We have assigned this hypothesis a prior probability
P (H) = p(h)dh. The data D is a string of NA A’s and
NB B’s, in a particular order; each of the N = NA +NB
outcomes is assumed to be independent of all the oth-
ers. Using the definition of independence, we see that
the likelihood is
P (D|H) = P (A)NAP (B)NB
= hNA(1− h)NB . (2)
Applying Bayes’ Theorem, we get the posterior probabil-
ity
P (H |D) = P (D)−1hNA(1− h)NBp(h)dh, (3)
where
P (D) =
∫ 1
0
hNA(1− h)NBp(h)dh. (4)
If the number of trials N is large, and if the prior proba-
bility p(h) has been chosen to be a slowly varying func-
tion, then the posterior probability P (H |D) has a sharp
peak at h = hexp ≡ NA/N , the fraction of trials that
resulted in outcome A. The width of this peak is propor-
tional to N−1/2 if both NA and NB are large, and to N
−1
if either NA or NB is small (or zero). Thus, after a large
number of trials, we can be confident that the probabil-
ity P (A) that the next outcome will be A is close to the
fraction of trials that have already resulted in A. The
only people who will not be convinced of this are those
whose choice of prior probability p(h) is strongly biased
against the value h = hexp. Thus, the value hexp for the
probability h is becoming objective, in the sense that al-
most all observers agree on it. Furthermore, those who
do not agree can be identified a priori by noting that
their prior probabilities are strong functions of h.
Those who reject the notion of a probability of a proba-
bility, but who accept the practical utility of this analysis
(which was originally carried out by Laplace), have two
options. Option one is to declare that h is not actually a
probability; it is rather a limiting frequency or a propen-
sity or a chance. Option two is to declare that p(h)dh is
not actually a probability; it is a measure or a generating
function.
Let us explore option two in more detail. Rather than
assigning a second-order probability to H = “P (A) is
between h and h + dh”, we assign a probability to ev-
ery finite sequence of outcomes; that is, we choose values
for P (A), P (B), P (AB), P (BA), P (AAA), P (AAB),
and so on, for strings of arbitrarily many outcomes. We
assume that all possible strings of N outcomes form
a complete set. Our probability assignments must of
course satisfy the probability axioms, so that, for exam-
ple, P (A) + P (B) = 1. We also insist that the assign-
ments be symmetric; that is, independent of the ordering
of the outcomes, so that, for example,
P (AAB) = P (ABA) = P (BAA). (5)
Furthermore, the assignments for strings of N outcomes
must be consistent with those for N + 1 outcomes; this
means that, for any particular string of N outcomes S,
P (S) = P (SA) + P (SB). (6)
A set of probability assignments that satisfies these re-
quirements is said to be exchangeable. Then, the de
Finetti representation theorem [4] states that, given an
exchangeable set of probability assignments for all possi-
ble strings of outcomes, the probability of getting a spe-
cific string D of N outcomes that includes exactly NA
A’s and NB B’s can always be written in the form
P (D) =
∫ 1
0
hNA(1− h)NBp(h)dh, (7)
where p(h) is a unique nonnegative function that obeys
the normalization condition
∫ 1
0
dh p(h) = 1, and is the
same for every string D. Note that eq. (7) is exactly the
same as eq. (4). Thus an exchangeable probability as-
signment to sequences of outcomes can be characterized
by a function p(h) that can be (as we have seen) consis-
tently treated as a probability of a probability. But those
who find this notion unpalatable are free to think of p(h)
as specifying a measure, or a generating function, or a
similar euphemism.
To summarize, if we need to assign a prior probability
but have little information, it can be more constructive
to abjure, and instead assign a probability to a range
of possible values of the needed prior probability. This
probability of a probability can then be updated with
Bayes’ theorem as more information comes in.
IV. PROBABILITY IN QUANTUM
MECHANICS
Suppose we are given a qubit: a quantum system with
a two-dimension Hilbert space. (We will use the language
4appropriate to a spin-one-half particle to describe it.) We
are asked to make a guess for its quantum state.
Without further information, the best we can do is
invoke the principle of indifference. In the case of a finite
set of possible outcomes, this principle is based on the
permutation symmetry of the outcomes; we choose the
unique probability assignment that is invariant under this
symmetry. The quantum analog of the permutation of
outcomes is the unitary symmetry of rotations in Hilbert
space. The only quantum state that is invariant under
this symmetry is the fully mixed density matrix
ρ = 1
2
I. (8)
Thus we are instructed to choose eq. (8) as the quantum
state of the system. While this assignment is logically
sound, we clearly cannot have a great deal of confidence
in it; typically, we are prepared to abandon it as soon as
we get some more information.
Another (and, we argue, better) strategy is to retreat
from the responsibility of assigning a particular state
(pure or mixed) to the system, and instead assign a prob-
ability P (H) to the statement H = “the quantum state
of the system is a density matrix within a volume dρ cen-
tered on ρ”, where ρ is a particular 2×2 hermitian matrix
with nonnegative eigenvalues that sum to one, and dρ is
a suitable differential volume element in the space of such
matrices. We can parameterize ρ with three real numbers
x, y, and z via
ρ =
1
2
(
1 + z x− iy
x+ iy 1− z
)
, (9)
where where x2 + y2 + z2 ≡ r2 ≤ 1. We then take
dρ = dV , where dV = (3/4pi)dx dy dz is the normal-
ized volume element:
∫
dV = 1. P (H) takes the form
p(ρ)dV , where p(ρ) is a nonnegative function that we
must choose, normalized by
∫
p(ρ)dV = 1. We might
choose p(ρ) = 1, for example.
Now suppose we get some more information about the
quantum state of the system. Suppose that the proce-
dure that prepares the quantum state of the particle can
be recreated repeatedly (each repetition of this will be
called a trial), and that the outcomes of measurements
performed on each prepared system are (we believe) inde-
pendent. Suppose further that we have access to a Stern–
Gerlach apparatus that allows us to measure whether the
spin is + or − along an axis of our choice. We choose
the z axis. Suppose that the result of the first N trials
is N+ +’s and N− −’s. What can we say now?
Given a density matrix ρ, parameterized by eq. (9), the
rules of quantum mechanics tell us that the probability
that a measurement of the spin along the z axis will yield
+1 is
P (σz =+1|ρ) = Tr
1
2
(1 + σz)ρ =
1
2
(1 + z), (10)
where σz is a Pauli matrix, and the probability that this
measurement will yield −1 is
P (σz =−1|ρ) = Tr
1
2
(1 − σz)ρ =
1
2
(1− z). (11)
Now we use Bayes’ theorem. Our hypothesis is H =
“the quantum state is within a volume dρ centered on
ρ”. We have assigned this hypothesis a prior probability
P (H) = p(ρ)dρ. The data D is a string of N+ +’s and
N− −’s, in a particular order; each of the N = N++N−
outcomes is assumed to be independent of all the others.
Using the definition of independence, we see that the
likelihood is
P (D|H) = [P (σz =+1|ρ)]
N+ [P (σz =+1|ρ)]
N
−
= [ 1
2
(1 + z)]N+ [ 1
2
(1− z)]N− . (12)
Applying Bayes’ Theorem, we get the posterior probabil-
ity
P (H |D) = P (D)−1[ 1
2
(1+z)]N+[ 1
2
(1−z)]N−p(ρ)dρ, (13)
where
P (D) =
∫
[ 1
2
(1 + z)]N+ [ 1
2
(1− z)]N−p(ρ)dρ. (14)
When the number of trials N is large, and the prior prob-
ability p(ρ) is a slowly varying function, the posterior
probability P (H |D) has a sharp peak at z = zexp ≡
(N+ − N−)/N . Thus, after a large number of trials in
which we measure σz, we can be confident of the value of
the parameter z in the density matrix of the system. The
only people who will not be convinced of this are those
whose choice of prior probability p(ρ) is strongly biased
against the value z = zexp. Furthermore, those who do
not agree can be identified a priori by noting that their
prior probabilities are strong functions of ρ.
We can of course orient our Stern–Gerlach apparatus
along different axes. If we choose the x axis or the y axis,
the relevant predictions of quantum mechanics are
P (σx =+1|ρ) = Tr
1
2
(1 + σx)ρ =
1
2
(1 + x), (15)
P (σx =−1|ρ) = Tr
1
2
(1− σx)ρ =
1
2
(1− x), (16)
P (σy =+1|ρ) = Tr
1
2
(1 + σy)ρ =
1
2
(1 + y), (17)
P (σy =−1|ρ) = Tr
1
2
(1− σy)ρ =
1
2
(1− y). (18)
For each trial, we can choose whether to measure σx, σy,
or σz . (We could also choose to measure along any other
axis.) Then, if the outcomes include N+z measurements
of σz with the result σz = +1, and so on, the posterior
probability becomes
P (H |D) = P (D)−1[ 1
2
(1 + x)]N+x [ 1
2
(1− x)]N−x
× [ 1
2
(1 + y)]N+y [ 1
2
(1− y)]N−y
× [ 1
2
(1 + z)]N+z [ 1
2
(1− z)]N−zp(ρ)dρ, (19)
where P (D) is given by the obvious integral. Clearly
the discussion in the preceding paragraph is simply trip-
licated, and, when the number of trials is large, we have
determined the entire density matrix to the satisfaction
5of all but strongly biased observers. Our subjective prob-
abilities of probabilities have led us to an objective con-
clusion about quantum probabilities.
In [1], Caves et al arrived at an essentially identical
result. The main difference in their analysis is that they
regarded p(ρ)dρ as a measure rather than a probability.
This approach required them to prove, first, a quantum
version of the de Finetti theorem [5], and, second, that
Bayes’ theorem can be applied to p(ρ)dρ [6]. Both steps
become unnecessary if we treat p(ρ)dρ as, fundamentally,
a probability.
V. PROBABILITIES FOR DENSITY MATRICES
VS. DENSITY MATRICES
If we assign an impure density matrix ρ to a quantum
system, does this not already take into account our igno-
rance about it? Why is it preferable to assign, instead, a
probability p(ρ)dρ to the set of possible density matrices?
It depends on the nature of our ignorance. Suppose,
for example, the system is the spin of an electron plucked
from the air. Then we expect that eq. (8) will describe
it, in the sense that if we do repeated trials (plucking
a new electron each time, and measuring its spin along
an axis of our choice), we will find that xexp ≡ (N+x −
N−x)/(N+x +N−x), yexp ≡ (N+y −N−y)/(N+y +N−y),
and zexp ≡ (N+z −N−z)/(N+z +N−z) all tend to zero.
Suppose instead that the spin is prepared by a techni-
cian who (with the aid of a Stern–Gerlach device) puts it
in either a pure state with σz = +1, or a pure state with
σx = +1, and each time decides which choice to make
by flipping a coin that we believe is fair. In this case the
appropriate density matrix is
ρ = 1
2
[ 1
2
(1 + σz)] +
1
2
[ 1
2
(1 + σx)]
=
1
4
(
3 1
1 1
)
. (20)
Comparing with eq. (9), we see that we now we expect
xexp, yexp, and zexp to approach +
1
2
, 0, and + 1
2
, respec-
tively.
Now suppose that the spin is prepared by a technician
who puts it in either a pure state with σz = +1, or a pure
state with σx = +1, and makes the same choice every
time. We, however, are not aware of what her choice is.
If forced to assign a particular density matrix, we
would have to choose eq. (20). However, our situation
is clearly different from what it was in the previous ex-
ample. In the present case, repeated experiments would
not verify eq. (20), but would instead converge on either
xexp = 0 and zexp = +1, or xexp = +1 and zexp = 0.
Therefore, in this case, it is more appropriate to assign a
prior probability of one-half to ρ = 1
2
(1+σz) and a prior
probability one-half to ρ = 1
2
(1 + σx). Then, as data
comes in, we can update these probability assignments
with Bayes’ theorem, as described in section IV.
Thus, it is better to choose p(ρ)dρ when it is possible
that there is something about the preparation procedure
that consistently prefers a particular direction in Hlibert
space, but we do not know what that direction is. Since
this possibility can rarely be ruled out a priori, we are
typically better served by choosing a prior probability
p(ρ)dρ, rather than a particular vaue of ρ itself.
VI. NONINFORMATIVE PRIORS FOR
DENSITY MATRICES
Suppose we have decided to choose a prior probability
p(ρ)dρ for the density matrix ρ of some quantum system.
How should we choose this probability?
In the case where we have little or no information about
the quantum system, we would like to formulate the ap-
propriate analog of the principle of indifference. Consider
a qunit, a quantum system whose Hilbert space has di-
mension n that is known to us. (We will not consider the
even more general problem where n is unknown.) We
can always write the density matrix (whatever it is) in
the form
ρ = U−1ρ˜ U, (21)
where U is unitary with determinant one, and ρ˜ is di-
agonal with nonnegative entries p1, . . . , pn that sum to
one. There is a natural measure for special unitary ma-
trices, the Haar measure; it is invariant under U → CU ,
where C is a constant special unitary matrix. In the
simplest case of n = 2, we can parameterize U as
U = eiα1σ3eiα2σ2eiα3σ3 , with 0 ≤ α1 ≤ pi, 0 ≤ α2 ≤ pi/2,
0 ≤ α3 ≤ pi; then the normalized Haar measure is
dU = pi−2 sin(2α2)dα1dα2dα3. This construction is ex-
tended to all n in [7].
Suppose we know that the state of the quantum system
is pure. Then we can set ρ˜ij = δi1δj1, and parameterize
ρ via U . Then it is natural to choose dρ = dU and
p(ρ) = 1, because this is the only choice that is invariant
under unitary rotations in Hilbert space.
Now consider the more general case where we do not
have information about the purity of the system’s quan-
tum state. Following [8], we define the volume element
via
dρ ≡ dUdF, (22)
where dU is the normalized Haar measure for U , and
dF = (n−1)! δ(p1 + . . .+ pn − 1)dp1 . . . dpn (23)
is a normalized measure for the pi’s that we will call the
Feynman measure (because it appears in the evaluation
of one-loop Feynman diagrams). Eq. (23) assumes that
each pi runs from zero to one; then eq. (21) is an over-
complete construction, because U can rearrange the pi’s.
This is easily fixed by imposing p1 ≥ . . . ≥ pn, and mul-
tiplying dF by n!. However, eq. (23) as it stands is easier
6to write and think about; the overcompleteness of this
construction of ρ causes no harm.
In the case n = 2, we previously chose dρ = dV =
(3/4pi)dx dy dz for the parameterization of eq. (9). In this
case, the eigenvalues of ρ are 1
2
(1+ r) and 1
2
(1− r), with
0 ≤ r ≤ 1. After integrating over U , dV → 3r2 dr; in
comparison, dF = dr for this case.
The purity of a density matrix ρ can be paramertized
by Tr ρ2, which for n = 2 is 1
2
(1 + r2). Thus the volume
measure dV is more biased towards pure states than is the
Feynman measure dF ; we have dV = 3(2Tr ρ2 − 1)dF .
In general, we can accomodate any such bias by taking
p(ρ)dρ to be of the form
p(ρ)dρ = p(Tr ρ2)dUdF, (24)
where p(x) is an increasing function if we are biased to-
wards having a pure state. For n > 2, we can take p to
be a function of Tr ρk for 2 ≤ k ≤ n. Arguments in favor
of various choices of p have been put forth [9], but no
single choice seems particularly compelling. Of course,
once we have done enough experiments, our original bi-
ases become largely irrelevant, as we saw in section IV.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
We have argued that, in a Bayesian framework, the
nature of our ignorance about a quantum system can of-
ten be more faithfully represented by a prior probability
p(ρ)dρ over the range of allowed density matrices, rather
than by a specific choice of density matrix. This method
is particularly appropriate when (1) the preparation pro-
cedure may favor a direction in Hilbert space, but we do
not know what that direction is, and (2) we can recre-
ate the preparation procedure repeatedly, and perform
measurements of our choice on each prepared system. In
this case, as data comes in, we use Bayes’ theorem to up-
date p(ρ)dρ. Eventually, all but strongly biased observers
(who can be identified a priori by an examination of their
choice of prior probability) will be convinced of the values
of the quantum probabilities. In this way, initially sub-
jective probability assignments become more and more
objective.
In choosing p(ρ)dρ, we can use the principle of indiffer-
ence, applied to the unitary symmetry of Hilbert space,
to reduce the problem to one of choosing a probability
distribution for the eigenvalues of ρ. There is, however,
no compelling rationale for any particular choice; in par-
ticular, we must decide how biased we are towards pure
states.
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